MLB Pitching Decisions Are Based On Suppositions and Definitions

The pitching expectations for relievers are even lower than the starters, as confirmed by the non-sensible SV rule. Actually, the SV is not a rule; it is the definition of a statistic. Walks and strikeouts are rules, a balk is a rule; On Base Percentage and a Sacrifice Fly are definitions of a statistic, as is a SV. However, a manager by himself cannot determine the OBP of a player, or guarantee the execution of a SF, but he can, and does, determine which pitcher to put in the position to earn a SV. This statistic for relievers has become the primary driver behind the pitching strategy used by a manager. It’s amazing, but Baseball and its fans have swallowed this current process hook, line, and sinker.

In the “old school” days the rule of thumb was that a relief pitcher should at least be able to pitch through the opposing team’s lineup once. The rational was that the typical reliever was a starter that didn’t have enough quality pitches, or stamina, to pitch an extended number of innings. Now, the practice is to have a new relief pitcher start an inning so that he doesn’t have to enter a game with runners on base and pitches only that inning so he can theoretically pitch more often. With a lead teams now have set-up pitchers to pitch the 8th inning before the closers who are designated to earn a SV. Some teams also have a designated pitcher to pitch the 7th inning with a lead, to set-up the set-up pitcher which results in a minimum of three relievers to pitch the last three innings, or four, or more, if a reliever is used in the 6th inning.

It used to be that the primary reliever of a team would be used when needed in critical game situations, at the discretion of the manager, if the game was close, and many times for two or more innings. Examples are NL, MVP, Jim Konstanty, 16-7 in 1950 with 72 Games/152 Innings Pitched, Roy Face, 18-1 in 1959, 57 G/93.1 IP, Dick Radatz, 15-6 in 1963, 66 G/132 IP plus 16-9 in 1964, 79 G/157 IP, and John Hiller, 17-14 in 1974, 59 G/150 IP. Also in 1974, Mike Marshall, 14-11, had 92 G/179 IP and in 1975, 15-12, an amazing 106 G/208.1 IP. Compare that to today’s starters that are considered “innings eaters” if they reach 200 IP, by pitching every fifth day with 100 pitches and half of them don’t have to bat or run the bases.

Hall of Famer, Hoyt Wilhelm, appeared in 1070 G, only 52 were starts of which he had 20 Complete Games. In 1952, his rookie year, he led the NL in ERA (2.43) strictly as a reliever with 71 G/159.1 IP and in 1959, led the AL in ERA (2.19) as a starter (15-11) with 32 G/226 IP. At age 47, in 1970, he was also a NL All-Star with 53 G/82 IP.

Konstanty started the first 1950 World Series game for the “Whiz Kids” Phillies against the Yankees, because of the overuse of their starters at the end of the season. All he did was pitch eight innings, giving up one run. Could one of today’s relievers do that?

Satchel Paige, in 1952, at age 45, was an AL All-Star leading the league with 35 games finished, 46 G/138 IP, starting 6 games with 3 CG and 2 shutouts.

Since he saw all of the above, and more, the opinion of Hall of Famer, in his 1990 book, Now Pitching BOB FELLER, concerning the way relief pitchers are used today was simple, “There’s too much of it. It’s one of those cases where more is not necessarily better.” He concluded that the approach many managers and pitching coaches take is, “… just an excessive use of relief pitchers, which is not to be confused with good baseball. In too many cases, it’s a sign of something else – over-managing. It doesn’t improve your chances of winning. It just makes the game longer.” Shortly before he died in 2010, in an interview on TV, Feller said that he was lucky when he pitched for the Cleveland Indians that Lou Boudreau was their player-manager (1945-1950) and therefore unable to over-manage as they do today.

There have been three definitions of a SV since 1969, with the third one in effect since 1975, which is:

He is the finishing pitcher in a game won by his team; he is not the winning pitcher; he is credited with at least 1/3 of an inning pitched and he satisfies one of the following conditions:

1. He enters the game with a lead of no more than three runs and pitches for at least one inning; or

2. He enters the game, regardless of the score, with the potential tying run either on base, at bat, or on deck; or

3. He pitches for at least three innings.

Any time a team has a three run lead in the last inning the manager will put his closer in the game, as he is obligated to do so because of the SV stat. It’s like 100 pitches for starters, reach, or come close to that number, and he’s out; for closers if the situation qualifies for a SV, he’s in. How many times have you seen a closer enter a game in a non-save situation and struggle to get the other side out? Their mind-set is that they expect to only be used in every SV opportunity and other relievers should be used in all non-save situations.

Because of the last two words, “on deck,” Part 2 is even worse. If a reliever pitches the last inning with a one run lead, he faces the potential tying run at least three times and could also face the potential winning run three times. Part 2 allows a reliever to get a SV with one out, without even facing the tying run at bat. What on earth does the player standing in the on deck circle have to do with deciding the outcome of a game? Nothing! It could be King Kong or Daffy Duck, with the Hulk lurking in the dugout, but whoever it is, a cartoon character, decoy, or Babe Ruth; it doesn’t matter if he never gets to bat. Is it another Mork – E.T. mind game? Probably! The definition dictates strategy and expectations. Not performance.

https://youtu.be/C0qBiUlsIh4